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I. INTRODUCTION
In Green v. Village of Terrytown,' the plaintiff sued three de-
fendants, the Village of Terrytown and two of its employees. On
December 31, 1971, the court entered summary judgment in favor
of the defendant Village of Terrytown. On January 10, 1972, the
plaintiff filed a motion for new trial as to that December 31 order.
The motion was denied on January 31, 1972. On March 20, 1972,
summary judgment was entered in favor of the two individual de-
fendants. On March 29, 1972, the plaintiff filed a motion for new
trial as to all defendants. That motion was denied, and on April
27, 1972, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal as to all three defend-
ants.2 The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the dismissal on
December 31, 1971, of the defendant Village of Terrytown was a
final and appealable order and that the failure to complete an ap-
peal within the time required by statute necessitated a dismissal
of the appeal as to that defendant.3
The Green case presented to the Supreme Court of Nebraska
for the first time the issue of the appealability of a judgment
1. 188 Neb. 840, 199 N.W.2d 610 (1972).
2. Brief for Appellant at 1-2, Green v. Village of Terrytown, 188 Neb.
840, 199 N.W.2d 610 (1972).
3. 188 Neb. at 842, 199 N.W.2d at 611. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1912 (Reissue
1964) provides for appeals to the Supreme Court of Nebraska from a
district court:
The proceedings to obtain a reversal, vacation or modification
of judgments and decrees rendered or final orders made by
the district court ... shall be by filing in the office of the
clerk of the district court in which such judgment, decree
or final order was rendered, within one month after the
rendition of such judgment or decree, or the making of such
final order, or within one month from the overruling of a
motion for a new trial in said cause, a notice of intention to
prosecute such appeal ... and ... by depositing with the
clerk of the district court the docket fee required by law in
appeals to the Supreme Court.
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which dismisses one or more but fewer than all of the parties to an
action and which leaves the action pending as to the remaining
parties. This article will analyze the various rules that the state
courts and the federal courts, prior to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, have adopted to deal with this issue. Rule 54(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also will be discussed in terms
of its modification of the federal rules and its advantages over the
state court rules. In conclusion, this article will recommend the
adoption of Rule 54(b) in Nebraska.
II. SINGLE JUDICIAL UNIT THEORY
At the early common law an action was a single judicial unit
even though it contained multiple claims or multiple parties. A
judgment could be appealed only as a single judicial unit. The
general rule, therefore, was that an appeal would not lie to bring
up a judgment that had not completely disposed of the action. 4 In
other words, it must dispose of all the issues as to all the parties.
Metcalf's Case5 was an early statement of the single judicial unit
theory:
[I]f the record should be removed till (before) the whole matter
is determined, there would be a failure of right; for the Judges of
the King's Bench cannot proceed upon the matter which is not de-
termined, and upon which no judgment is given; and the whole
record ought to be either in the Common Pleas or in the King's
Bench; also the original is entire, and cannot be there and here
likewise.6
There are only a very small number of state courts that con-
tinue strictly to apply the single judicial unit theory when it comes
to the multiple party case.7 In those states following the strict
doctrine, an order is interlocutory, and hence not appealable if it
does not dispose of the case as to all the parties.8 In Green had the
4. 6 J. MooRE, FEDmiAL PRACTicE f 54.19, at 211 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MooRB]. At the time of its inception, the single judicial unit
rule may have been sound. As a practical matter, difficulty in pre-
paring and transmitting judicial records supported the rule. Further-
more, the limited joinder of parties and issues and the jealousy that
existed between the common law courts explain the reasons for the
rule.
5. 77 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1615).
6. Id. at 1196.
7. Some recent cases which have applied the single judicial unit rule are:
Dudeck v. Ellis, 376 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. 1964); McDaniel v. Lovelace, 392
S.W.2d 422 (Mo. App. 1965); In re Old Colony Coal Co., 49 N.J. Super
117, 139 A.2d 302 (1958); Martin v. City of Ashland, 233 Ore. 512, 378
P.2d 711 (1963); First Nat'l Bank v. Noble, 179 Ore. 26, 168 P.2d 354
(1946); Potter v. Sanderson, 199 Tenn. 337, 286 S.W.2d 873 (1956).
8. In McDaniel v. Lovelace, 392 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. App. 1965), the court
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single judicial unit rule been applied, the dismissal of the Village
would not have been final and appealable because the action was
left pending against the two individual defendants.
III. EXCEPTION TO SINGLE JUDICIAL UNIT THEORY
In the federal courts, prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the exceptions to the single judicial unit rule
in multiple party cases were well defined.
A judgment was final where it terminated the action as to one
or more but fewer than all of the defendants unless the alleged
liability was joint. The leading federal case was Hohorst v. Ham-
burg-American Packet Co.9 Hohorst brought an acton against
the Hamburg Company and several individual defendants for pat-
ent infringements. The company was dismissed from the action
because the court had no personal jurisdiction over it. Hohorst
appealed from the dismissal. Hohorst's appeal was dismissed be-
cause the alleged liability of the defendants was joint. All the
defendants had cooperated and participated in the acts of infringe-
ment. Therefore, there could be no appeal until a judgment dis-
posed of the case as to all parties.10
In the context of determining whether an order as to one of
several defendants was final and appealable, "joint liability" had
a much broader meaning than the technical definition.,' Tech-
nically, joint liability is a common liability incurred by two or
more persons, in which the obligors bind themselves as a unit but
not severally. Suit on a joint liability must be prosecuted in a
single action against the obligors. The Hohorst doctrine of non-
finality extended not only to the cases where the defendants were
truly jointly liable but also to cases where some of the defendants
were secondarily liable or to cases where the liability of the de-
fendants arose out of the same set of facts and was interrelated.' 2
very succinctly stated the rule:
The motion [to dismiss the appeal] must be sustained for the
reason that the order appealed from was not a final judgment
for the purpose of appeal, since it did not dispose of the case
as to all the parties.
Id. at 426.
9. 148 U.S. 262 (1893).
10. Id. at 265-66.
11. 6 MooRE, supra note 4, at q 54.23 (4), at 257.
12. Id. at 54.19, at 213. In the Hohorst case itself, one of the defendants
was only secondarily liable. Another secondary liability case was
Oneida Nay. Corp. v. W. & S. Job & Co., 252 U.S. 521 (1920). The
Hohorst doctrine was applied because the alleged liability of the
several defendants arose out of closely related circumstances in Bank
of Rondout v. Smith, 156 U.S. 330 (1895), and Moss v. Kansas City
Life Ins. Co., 96 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1938).
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The corollary to the rule of non-finality in the joint liability cases
was that an order final in its nature as to a matter distinct from
the general subject of the litigation and affecting only the par-
ties to the particular controversy, may be reviewed without await-
ing the determination of the general litigation. The rule was suc-
cinctly stated in Republic of China v. American Express Co.:13
[The Hohorst doctrine of non-finality] applies where the dismis-
sal is of a party or parties jointly charged, or jointly claiming, with
other parties who are not dismissed; but there is no doctrine that
finality is lacking in an order simply and solely because it dismisses
less than all the parties. Where "jointness," in some form, is ab-
sent, the test in multiple party cases is whether the order termin-
ates the suit "as a severable matter," or a "distinct matter," with
respect to the party dismissed. 14
The rule stated in the American Express Co. case which will
be referred to as the "joint liability test," is found in nearly all
state court cases on this issue.15 However, the extent to which
some of these courts are in reality applying the old single judicial
unit rule while paying only lip service to the joint liability test is
not clear.' " In Bradley v. Holmes,17 for example, the court stated:
Since a judgment is not final which settles a case as to a part only
of the defendants, an order which dismisses the suit as to a part
13. 190 F.2d 334 (2d Cir. 1951).
14. Id. at 335-36.
15. See Beavers v. Beavers, 55 Ariz. 122, 99 P.2d 95 (1940); Reuter v.
City of Oskaloosa, 253 Iowa 768, 113 N.W.2d 716 (1962); Vincent v.
Plecker, 319 Mass. 560, 67 N.E.2d 145 (1946); Bradley v. Holmes, 242
Miss. 247, 134 So. 2d 494 (1961) ; Pan American Petroleum Corp v. Texas
Pac. C. & 0. Co., 320 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Attorney
General of Utah v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277 (1937). Wells
v. Whitaker, 207 Va. 616, 151 S.E.2d 422 (1966); Bowles v. City of
Richmond, 147 Va. 720, 129 S.E. 489, aff'd on rehearing, 147 Va. 729, 133
S.E. 593 (1926).
The rule is stated in Vincent v. Plecker, 319 Mass. 560, 565, 67
N.E.2d 145, 148:
[W]here the liability of one defendant is not dependent upon
or intertwined with that of another, but is independent, a
decree dismissing the bill as against him is a final decree
determinative of the separable controversy between him and
the plaintiff, and is appealable as such.
16. There are several cases which do no more than quote the rule set out
in the text corresponding to note 18 infra. It is highly questionable
whether these courts understand the reference to "joint liability" in
the quoted rule. If they do understand it, there is generally no attempt
in these cases to apply the joint liability test. The result in these
cases is that the order is found to be interlocutory because the order
does not dispose of all the issues as to all the parties. See, e.g., Reuter
v. City of Oskaloosa, 253 Iowa 768, 113 N.W.2d 716 (1962); Bradley v.
Holmes, 242 Miss. 247, 134 So. 2d 494 (1961); Pan American Petroleum
Corp. v. Texas Pac. C. & 0. Co., 320 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
17. 242 Miss. 247, 134 So. 2d 494 (1961).
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only of them, all of whom are charged to be jointly liable, is not a
final judgment from which an appeal will lie, while the case re-
mains undisposed of in the lower court as to the other defend-
dants .... 28
There was no further indication from the court whether the order
was not final because it dismissed only part of the defendants or
because it dismissed only part of the defendants all of whom were
jointly charged. There was no attempt by the court to define what
was meant by "jointly liable;" moreover, the court did not deter-
mine the nature of the liability on the part of the various defend-
ants.19 Absent a determination of whether "jointness" in some
form is present, it cannot be said that the joint liability test was
applied.
Even those courts that do attempt to apply the joint liability
test have not been consistent because of the difficulty of deter-
mining when the defendants are "jointly charged." As was noted
above, the federal courts extended the concept of "jointness" be-
yond joint liability in its technical sense. This same nebulous con-
cept of jointness was carried over into state court cases. In Vincent
v. Plecker,20 the test of jointness was met if the liability of one
defendant was "dependent upon or intertwined" with that of an-
other. The liability of one defendant was separate and distinct if
it was "independent" of the other's liability.
21
Perhaps the most cogent discussion of the distinction between
separate and joint interests for purposes of determining the ap-
pealability of an order dismissing fewer than all the defendants is
found in Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy.22
[TIhe judgment is severable when the original determination
of those issues by the trial court and reflected in the judgment
18. Id. at 250, 134 So. 2d at 495 (emphasis added).
19. The Bradley court stated that a narrow exception to this rule exists
where a decree dismisses one or more of a larger number of defendants
whose interests are not all connected with the other. The Bradley case
was a wrongful death action arising out of an automobile collision
against an employee and his employer. The circuit court dismissed
the suit as to the employer and ordered a new trial as to the employee.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the judgment was not a
final order and plaintiff's appeal was premature. The court simply
stated that the case was not within the narrow exception. In Ne-
braska, under Dickey v. Meier, 188 Neb. 420, 197 N.W.2d 385 (1972),
in an action against an employer and his employee for the negligent
acts of the employee, the employer has only secondary or derivative
liability. Secondary liability has generally been held to satisfy the
test of "jointness" as it is contemplated by the joint liability test.
20. 319 Mass. 560, 67 N.E.2d 145 (1946).
21. See the quotation from Vincent v. Plecker, 319 Mass. 560, 67 N.E.2d
145 (1946), note 15 supra.
22. 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277 (1937).
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or any determination which could be made as the result of an ap-
peal cannot affect the determination of the remaining issues of the
suit, nor can the determination of such remaining issues affect the
issues between plaintiff and the dismissed defendants if such de-
fendants are restored to the case by a reversal.
It seems to us that, unless the term "identity of interest," is de-
fined, it does not aid much as a test, but that the test rather is
whether the determination of the issues as to any defendant de-
pends on or affects the determination of the issues as to the other
defendants .... If the claimed basis of liability of the dismissed
defendants is connected with or so related to the claimed basis of
liability of the remaining defendants so that one may affect the
other, a judgment as to the discharged defendants is not appealable
until the issues as to the remaining defendants are settled.23
IV. RULE OF GREEN v. VILLAGE OF TERRYTOWN
The third alternative, in addition to the single judicial unit rule
and the joint liability test, is the rule announced in Green, i.e., that
the dismissal of one of several parties to an action is always a final
and appealable order. There are five states, including Nebraska
which have cases applying this third alternative.24  There is no
discussion in the texts or by commentators on any such rule. Sim-
ilarly, the cases themselves are silent as to the rationale behind
the rule. Historically, the law has always been opposed to piece-
meal appeals, and the single judicial unit rule announced in Met-
calfs Case25 is a strong statement of that policy. The joint lia-
bility test was adopted by the federal courts to avoid the inflexi-
bility of the single judicial unit rule but it only allowed appeal in
cases where the order dismissed the action as a distinct or inde-
pendent matter with respect to the dismissed party. The Supreme
Court of Nebraska in Green ignored this authority and phrased the
issue as if there were only two choices-either an order affecting
one or more of several parties to an action is always final or it is
never final.26
23. Id. at 462-63, 73 P.2d at 1294.
24. Schneider v. Manheimer, 170 So. 2d 75 (Fla. App. 1964); Ritter v.
Perma-Stone Co. 326 P.2d 442 (Okla. 1958); Adams v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 58 Wash. 2d 659, 364 P.2d 804 (1961); Newberger v. Pokrass, 27
Wis. 2d 405, 134 N.W.2d 495 (1965).
25. 77 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196 (K.B. 1615). See text accompanying note 6
supra.
26. The supreme court cited several cases in the Green opinion, none of
which were supplied to it by the opposing parties in their respective
briefs. The cases which the opinion cited as holding that the dismissal
as to one party is appealable are all cases very much like Green.
That is, none of the cases gives an analysis of why the order should
or should not be appealable; they simply state, in a very abbreviated
fashion, that the order is appealable.
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V. ANALYSIS OF THREE ALTERNATIVE RULES
Three alternative rules have been presented thus far, and it
may be helpful at this point to place them in perspective. The
single judicial unit rule and the rule of Green, referred to herein-
after as the "Nebraska rffle," are absolute rules. Under the single
judicial unit rule, an order is never appealable until the entire case
is disposed as to all the issues and all the parties. The Nebraska
rule is equally absolute in holding that the dismissal of one or
more but fewer than all of the parties to an action is always a final
and appealable order. The joint liability test lies between these
two extremes.
An analysis of the three alternative rules must begin with a con-
sideration of the policy to be furthered or protected. The Green
court stated the major competing considerations in determining the
effect of multiple parties on the finality and appealability of an
order.27 There is a strong historical policy against piecemeal or
successive appeals of only parts of cases where the entire action
could and should be viewed together. On the other hand, it may
be years before the dismissed party knows whether the litigation
is really final as to him, unless his status is settled by an immedi-
ate appeal. In other words there is a concern for inconvenience
and hardship caused by a delay in appealing the order.
Two of the cases which the court cited as holding that the order
was not appealable had no applicability because they were decided
under state statutes exactly like Federal Rule 54(b). Those cases
were Linkous v. Darch, 299 S.W.2d 120 (Ky. App. 1957), and Wilmurth
v. State, 79 Nev. 490, 387 P.2d 251 (1963).
Dudeck v. Ellis, 376 S.W.2d 197 (Mo. 1964); McDaniel v. Lovelace,
392 S.W.2d 422 (Mo. App. 1965); In re Old Colony Coal Co., 49 N.J.
Super 117, 139 A.2d 302 (1958); Martin v. City of Ashland, 233 Ore.
512, 378 P.2d 711 (1963), are accurately cited for the proposition that
a dismissal as to one or more of several parties is not final. The
other cases, Reuter v. City of Oskaloosa, 253 Iowa 768, 113 N.W.2d
716 (1962); Bradley v. Holmes, 242 Miss. 247, 134 So. 2d 494 (1961);
Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. C. & 0. Co., 320 S.W.2d
916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959), at least acknowledge the "jointness-sever-
able and distinct" exception to the rule. The opinion states, "These
cases apparently held that an order is not final unless it disposes of
all the issues as to all parties." 188 Neb. at 841, 199 N.W.2d at 611. Ap-
parently, the court did not know what these cases held.
27. [A] paramount consideration is to be liberal in permitting
appeals, but, on the other hand, that piecemeal or successive
appeals are not desirable. It would appear there is a further
consideration, namely that where there are multiple defend-
ants and the action is dismissed as to one defendant, that
defendant no longer has a voice in the determination of the
litigation to drag on for months or years, he has no way of
bringing an end to the litigation or ascertaining whether or
not it has been finally determined as to him.
188 Neb. at 841, 199 N.W.2d at 611.
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The major benefit in adopting either of the two absolute rules
is that it would lend a great deal of certainty to the question of
appealability. Under the single judicial unit rule, the parties know
that an appeal may not be taken until the entire case has been
disposed of. No less certain is the mandatory appeal of the dismis-
sal of one of several parties under the Nebraska rule. The value of
a rule that can be applied with certainty is not to be understated.
It is undesirable to place parties in a position of routinely bringing
appeals that are not allowed just to protect themselves against the
possibility that the order was final and appealable. Similarly, if a
plaintiff does not appeal an order dismissing one of several de-
fendants, that should have been appealed, he may lose his only
solvent defendant.28 Certainty is a virtue that should be a part of
the rule that is adopted.
However, the certainty of these rules comes at a high cost-either
the single judicial unit rule or the Nebraska rule provide certainty
at the expense of a well-reasoned approach to the problem. The
rules are too absolute and inflexible. If the Nebraska rule is
adopted, the court must necessarily determine that in every case
the correctness of the order dismissing one or more but fewer than
all the parties to an action must be settled immediately. There is
no recognition under the Nebraska rule that in some cases there
may be a just reason for delay. For example, successive appeals
may result in an appellate court re-examining many of the same
issues gone over on an earlier appeal; the appellate court may be
able to treat the issues more effectively if the case comes to it all
at one time rather than piecemeal. The single judicial unit rule,
on the other hand, recognizes no instance in which successive ap-
peals may be proper. Neither of these rules does anything to rec-
oncile the competing considerations. The second virtue that the
rule should have, and which the two absolute rules cannot pro-
vide, is flexibility.
The joint liability test recognizes the validity of the policies be-
hind both the Nebraska rule and the single judicial unit rule and
it attempts to balance the two in certain types of cases. The appli-
cation of this rule can best be demonstrated by discussing a few
actual cases.
The facts in Green are ideal for an analysis of the joint liability
28. This is probably what happened to the plaintiff in Green. The suit
was against the Village of Terrytown and two individual workmen
for the Village. The Village was dismissed from the action on a
summary judgment, and by failing to perfect a timely appeal as to
the Village, the plaintiff probably lost the only defendant who would
have been capable of satisfying a judgment.
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test.29 The two individual defendants, Bartow and McGuire, were
workmen for the Village of Terrytown. Bartow and McGuire did
some street repair and to protect the fresh concrete they placed a
telephone pole in the street as a barricade.3 0 No lights, reflectors
or other warnings were placed around the pole. At 10:45 p.m.
that same evening, the plaintiff while driving his motorcycle struck
the pole and sustained serious injuries.31 The Village was dismissed
from the action on summary judgment because it had not been
given notice by the plaintiff within 60 days from the accident, as
required by statute.32
At the outset, the court stated that the employment relation-
ship between the Village and the individual defendants had not
been determined.33  Under the joint liability test, this statement,
in itself, indicates that there was no adequate basis for determining
whether the dismissal of the Village was final and appealable. No
consideration of the concept of "jointness" was possible. The re-
sult as to finality may be substantially different if the two work-
men were independent contractors instead of employees.
When the appeal of Bartow and McGuire was decided by the
supreme court, they were classified as employees of the Village.34
The alleged negligent acts of the employees are imputed to the Vil-
lage and became the negligent acts of the Village. The real dis-
pute in the case was determining who had the duty to warn the
public that there was a telephone pole lying in the street-the Vil-
lage or the two employees. The analysis under the joint liability
test would be as follows. If the dismissal of the Village had been
29. When the supreme court decided the motion to dismiss the appeal of
the Village of Terrytown, the facts of the accident were not discussed.
These facts were discussed in Green v. Village of Terrytown, 189
Neb. 615, 204 N.W.2d 152 (1973), which was the appeal of the dis-
missal of the two individual defendants on summary judgment.
30. The pole was about 20 feet long, and it extended into the street by at
least 12 feet.
31. The accident occurred on May 17, 1967, and the action was filed against
the Village of Terrytown on Aug. 26, 1967. By Dec. 31, 1971, the action
had proceeded to dismissing the Village on summary judgment.
32. Neb. Laws c. 77, § 1, at 312 (1965), provided:
No city of the first class, second class or village shall be liable
for damages arising from defective streets, alleys, sidewalks,
public parks or other public places within such city or village,
unless actual notice in writing of the accident or injury ...
shall be proved to have been given to the mayor or chairman
of the city ... within sixty days after the occurrence of such
accident ....
The accident occurred on May 17, 1967, but the Village was not given
written notice until Aug. 1, 1967. This statute is no longer in effect.
33. 188 Neb. at 840, 199 N.W.2d at 610.
34. 189 Neb. at 616, 204 N.W.2d at 155.
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reversed on the merits,8 5 i.e., by a holding that the notice of injury
statute had been complied with, would a determination of the
issues as between the Village and the plaintiff have had an effect
on the determination of the issues, as between the plaintiff and the
Village employees? The answer is obvious. The duty was either
on the Village or on the employees; wherever it was, the Village
was potentially liable. If the duty was on the employees and they
were found negligent, the Village was vicariously liable. If the
Village had the independent duty to warn, it was potentially liable
in its own right. Whatever the determination of the duty and neg-
ligence issues, the Village would have been involved in any ap-
peal. When the Village was dismissed from the action, the deter-
mination of remaining issues as between the remaining defendants
and the plaintiff had a direct effect on the potential liability of the
Village. For that reason, under the joint liability test the order
of dismissal was not final and appealable as to them.
The Village, in its brief on the motion to dismiss the appeal,
argued that because the Village and the two individual defendants
had separate defenses, their liabilities were separate and distinct
from one another.30 The Village's defense was the plaintiff's fail-
35. The plaintiff did have a chance to get a reversal of the order dis-
missing the Village. Although the Village did not receive written
notice of the accident within sixty days of its occurrence, there was
evidence to indicate that it had actual notice within one or two days
after the accident. Furthermore, there was evidence that the Village's
liability insurance carrier investigated the accident within one week
after it happened. The question was then presented whether actual
notice would satisfy the statute. If actual notice would suffice, there
was a question of fact as to whether the Village did have actual
notice.
36. The allegations against the Village were that it negligently
kept and maintained an obstruction in the street without any
light or reflector or other device to warn travelers of the ex-
istence of said obstruction. The obligations and duties of
each are different. The obligations of workmen were to do
what their employer directed. They, as alleged, placed the
barricade in the "afternoon." The accident, as alleged, oc-
curred "at about the hour of 10:45 o'clock p.m." The obliga-
tion of the Village (if any) was to see that someone (not
necessarily Bartow and McGuire) placed proper warnings.
After dark, the situation may be different than [sic] in the
"afternoon" in May.
The matters were heard separately by separate orders. The
dismissal of the action against the Village of Terrytown was
not dependent in any way upon whether an action continued
to exist against the Defendants, Bartow and McGuire. Dis-
missal of the action against the Defendants, Bartow and Mc-
Guire, did not depend in any way upon continuance of the
action against the Village of Terrytown. They were inter-
dependent and separate.
Brief for Appellee at 5 (emphasis added). The village cited Vincent v.
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ure to notify the Village of his injury. The defense of the two
individual defendants was that they had no duty to erect a warn-
ing. This is not a valid argument under the joint liability test.
The true basis for determining the identity or independence of the
claims against the defendants is the nature of the alleged liability.
Wells v. Whitaker3 7 is a good example of a case where the de-
fenses of the separate defendants were different, but there was
still a finding of jointness. Wells was an action against an ex-
plosives processor (A) and the owner of the land (B) on which
the explosives plant had been located. The action was brought
by a homeowner to recover damages to his home resulting from an
explosion. B's defense was that he was in no way associated with
the operation of the explosives plant, and he owed no duty to the
plaintiff. B was dismissed from the action prior to trial. The
plaintiff's theory was that A and B were joint venturers. If the
plaintiff were to secure a reversal of B's dismissal and establish
that he was a joint venturer with A, then B would be charged
with liability for the same acts or omissions which are the basis
of A's liabiity.38 The court found that the dismissal of B was not
a final and appealable order because A and B were allegedly
"jointly liable."
Bowles v. City of Richmond 0 is quite similar to Green on the
facts, but it demonstrates the application of the joint liability test
where an order was held to be final and appealable.
The plaintiff was injured in a car-train collision within the city
limits of Richmond. Both the city and the railroad were sued for
failing adequately to safeguard the approach of the railroad on
Broad Street. The trial court sustained a demurrer of the city
and dismissed it from the action on the basis of the plaintiff's fail-
ure to file with the city attorney a written statement of the par-
ticulars of the accident within six months after its occurrence. The
Plecker, 319 Mass. 560, 67 N.E.2d 145 (1946), in its Brief. See note
15 supra. Vincent is really a case supporting the plaintiff's position
in this particular case. It is difficult to see how the action against
the defendants could be "interdependent" and "separate" at the same
time. Generally, when the liabilities of the several defendants are
interdependent, jointness is present, and the order is not final and
appealable.
Despite a wealth of authority to be found, the plaintiff in its brief,
cited no cases on point in favor of its position.
37. 207 Va. 616, 151 S.E.2d 422 (1966).
38. Id. at 629, 151 S.E.2d at 432. The decision in the Wells case is based
on the test of jointness explained in Attorney General of Utah v.
Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, 73 P.2d 1277 (1937).
39. 147 Va. 720, 129 S.E. 489, af-fd on rehearing, 147 Va. 729, 133 S..E.
593 (1926).
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plaintiff immediately appealed, and the city objected, arguing that
the order appealed from was not a final order. The Virginia Su-
preme Court held that it was a final and appealable order because
there was no joint interest between the defendants. 40 If the rail-
road had been found liable, this would have had no bearing on
whether the city did or did not have a potential liability to the
plaintiff. The duties, if any, of the two defendants to the plaintiff
were not identical. Here, the matter should properly have been
finally determined between the city and the plaintiff by a prompt
appeal.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska stated that Green was a case
of first impression in Nebraska.41 While this was correct, the court
has dealt with a closely related issue-whether a judgment against
one of several parties in an action may be appealed independently
of the others or whether the appeal of one of the judgments brings
the whole case up for review.
A representative case is Sturgis, Cornish & Burn Co. v. Miller.42
On May 11, 1900, Sturgis obtained a judgment on a bill of ex-
change against Hinman as principal and Miller and Helm as sure-
ties. Ten days later Hinman, alone, appealed and the May 11 judg-
ment as to him was set aside, and the case set for a new trial. At
the new trial, the court found in favor of Hinman and against
Sturgis, but it also found in favor of Sturgis against Helm. Judg-
ment was entered against Helm on December 7, 1900, and Hinman
was dismissed. Sturgis assigned his December 7 judgment against
Helm to the plaintiff. Helm's defense to the action brought against
him by the plaintiff was that the judgment of May 11 was not set
aside as to him and the trial court had no jurisdiction over him to
enter the December 7 judgment. The Supreme Court of Nebraska
decided that the May 11 judgment was an entirety and its re-
versal as to Hinman ipso facto set aside the judgment as to Helm
and Miller. The rule was stated:
[A] judgment is not considered an entirety unless the interests
of the judgment debtors are inseparable. If the interest of the de-
fendants against whom the judgment of May 11 was rendered was
not inseparable, then they were permitted each to prosecute his
40. Id. at 725, 129 S.E. at 490. The court stated:
Until he has dismissed the case as to the joint wrongdoers
against whom he has no judgment, or signifies an intention to
prosecute the action to judgment against them, as all arejointly liable, there is no final judgment, therefore there could
be no appeal. The principle of law above mentioned does
not apply to the instant case, as there is no joint interest be-
tween the defendants in the matters decided .. .therefore
the judgment is final as to the city ....
41. 188 Neb. at 840, 199 N.W.2d at 610.
42. 79 Neb. 404, 112 N.W. 595 (1907).
APPEALABILITY PROBLEMS IN NEBRASKA
own defense and present his own theory independently of the
other, and procure a new trial of the issues in which he is interested
without affecting the liability of his codefendant ....
But with inseparable interests, proceedings to vacate by one
would carry the entire case with it.43
The analogy between this rule44 and the issue presented in
Green is found in the rationale behind the rule. If the interests of
the several defendants are so intertwined that a decision as to one
must necessarily affect the potential liability of the other, there is
a need to review the case on an entirety. If the interests of the
parties are several and distinct, i.e., they have no effect one on the
other, there is no reason why just one party may not appeal.
The joint liability test then has some degree of flexibility. The
rule does attempt to distinguish between those cases where the
order affecting one or more but fewer than all of the parties to an
action should be final and appealable, on the one hand, and those
cases where there is a legitimate reason for delay on the other.
The joint liability test, however, is not without its weaknesses.
The joint liability test starts with the general proposition that an
order dismissing some but not all of several parties to an action
is not appealable. The rule then attempts to define those situa-
tions where there would be no reason for delaying an appeal of the
dismissed party until the entire case is decided. The only situa-
tion for which it provides is where the order terminates the action
as a separate or distinct matter with respect to the dismissed party.
The first basic shortcoming of the joint liability test is that it does
not take into consideration all of the factors which may be relevant
to a determination of whether there is a just reason for delay.
The Green case is an example of a case where another factor may
have come into play. In the above discussion of Green, it was de-
termined that under the joint liability test the dismissal of the Vil-
lage would not have been a final and appealable order. The Vil-
lage was the only defendant from whom the plaintiff was likely
to recover any money. In this situation, the plaintiff should be
able to appeal the Village's dismissal immediately. If the dismis-
sal were affirmed on appeal, the plaintiff may decide to save the
time and effort involved in pursuing a worthless judgment against
the two individual defendants.4 5  This determination, of course,
43. Id. at 409, 112 N.W. at 597.
44. A similar rule is stated in Fick v. Herman, 161 Neb. 110, 72 N.W.2d
598 (1955); Polk v. Covell, 43 Neb. 884, 62 N.W. 240 (1895); McHugh
v. Smiley, 17 Neb. 626, 24 N.W. 277 (1885).
45. Such a situation was presented in Pabellon v. Grace Line Inc., 191
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1951). Several defendants were jointly charged,
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would depend on the chances of recovery against the two defend-
ants and how much money was involved. These additional factors
that are peculiar to each individual case, but which are relevant
to whether there is or is not a reason for delay, are beyond the
scope of the joint liability test.
The second shortcoming of the joint liability test is that it is so
uncertain and difficult to apply. As has been alluded to before,
the concept of "jointness" is not susceptible to a precise definition.
It is not even possible to classify types of cases where an order
has been held to be appealable or not appealable on the basis of
this test. About the most precise statement that can be found is
"'jointness' is present where one of the parties is secondarily or
derivatively liable-or where the asserted liabilities of the defend-
ants, one of whom is dismissed, are very closely interrelated. '4
This type of a nebulous standard provides no guidance to a party
debating whether to appeal the dismissal of another party to the
action. The result is that if a protective appeal is brought in al-
most every case, many unnecessary appeals will be taken. On the
other hand, if a party does not appeal, mistakenly thinking he can
meet the jointness standard, he will lose the dismissed defendant
if the court determines there was no joint liability among the par-
ties and the appeal of the dismissed party should have been taken
immediately.
The only possible conclusion to this discussion of the three al-
ternative rules is that none of the three very effectively deals
with the problem. There is, however, a workable solution. It is
found in Rule 54 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
VI. FEDERAL RULE 54(b)
Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the most
workable solution to the issue presented in the Green case. It pro-
vides:
and previous to trial the one solvent defendant was dismissed. In 1951
the federal courts were operating under the joint liability test so the
dismissal could not be appealed-the defendants were jointly charged.
The court criticized the joint liability test:
Being unable to appeal from that order, plaintiff must go
through a long, expensive trial, lasting several months, in
which he obtains a judgment that is worthless practically,
before he can procure a reversal of the order dismissing the
solvent defendant, and thus be able to try and to prove his
case against that defendant.
Id. at 179.
46. Republic of China v. American Express Co., 190 F.2d 334 n.3 (2d Cir.
1951).
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When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim,
or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of
the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there
is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the
entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and di-
rection, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and lia-
bilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the ac-
tion as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form
of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities
of all the parties. 47
Rule 54(b) basically provides that an order or other form of
decision is not final if it adjudicates the rights and liabilities of
fewer than all the parties in the action unless the district court
makes (1) an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay, and (2) an express direction for the entry of judgment.48
A brief history of Rule 54(b) as it developed with regard to
the multiple party issue is necessary to understand the present
rule. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the joint liability test was used in the federal courts. The
original 54(b) adopted in 193840 did not apply to multiple parties;
it dealt only with the situation where the action involved multiple
claims. Rule 54(b) was amended in 1946 to read substantially the
same as it does now except that there was no reference to multiple
parties.50 The debate in the federal courts was whether Rule
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 54 (b).
48. Feist v. McGee, 433 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1970); Hartford Fire Ins Co.
v. Herrold, 434 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1970); Donovan v. Hayden, Stone,
Inc., 434 F.2d 619 (6th Cir. 1970); Sullivan v. Delaware River Port
Authority, 407 F.2d 58 (3d Cir. 1969); Coulter v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 411 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1969); Cram v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
375 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Evans, 365 F.2d 95 (10th
Cir. 1966); Fenton v. McCrory Corp., 47 F.R.D. 260 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
49. The original FED. R. Civ. P. 54 (b) provided:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
the court at any stage, upon a determination of the issues
material to a particular claim and all counter-claims arising
out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject
matter of the claim, may enter a judgment disposing of such
claim. The judgment shall terminate the action with respect
to the claim so disposed of and the action shall proceed as to
the remaining claims. In case a separate judgment is so
entered, the court by order may stay its enforcement until the
entering of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may pre-
scribe such conditions as are necessary to secure the benefit
thereof to the party in whose favor the judgment is entered.
50. After the 1946 amendment, FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) provided:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action,
whether as a claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party
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54(b), as amended in 1946, should also apply to the multiple party
case. A few courts allowed an appeal from a dismissal as to one
or more but fewer than all the parties where the trial judge made
the requisite finding that there was no just reason for delay.51
However, beginning with Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp.,5 2 the federal courts reversed these earlier decisions, and the
accepted rule became that Rule 54(b) did not apply to a case in-
volving multiple parties. 53 Therefore, even after the 1946 amend-
ment to Rule 54(b), the courts were still faced with the trouble-
some problem of distinguishing between "jointness" and "distinct-
ness." In 1961, Rule 54(b) was again amended to provide spe-
cifically for multiple parties.54
claim, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon
one or more but less than all of the claims only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In
the absence of such determination and direction, any order
or other form of decision, however, designated, which ad-judicates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action
as to any of the claims, and the order or other form of decision
is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judg-
ment adjudicating all claims.
51. Even though the 1946 version of Rule 54(b) did not specifically men-
tion parties, these courts reasoned that whenever several persons were
charged with liability, more than one claim for relief was presented.
See Pang Tsu Mow v. Republic of China, 225 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir.
1955); Rao v. Port of New York Authority, 222 F.2d 362 (2d Cir.
1955); Boston Med. Supply Co. v. Lea & Febriger, 195 F.2d 853 (1st
Cir. 1952).
52. 220 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1955).
53. Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Corp., 220 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1955)
stated:
We have answered the question posed by holding that Rule
54(b) means exactly what its words import. The Rule no-
where mentions parties. The Rule is poised on the word
claims-multiple claims. The word claims and the word
parties mean different things. They are simply dictionary
words which do not lose their substance when used in law.
As to their basic meaning Black and Webster are in accord.
These are not words of art. Parties are not claims.
Id. at 107. After the Steiner case, nearly all of the circuit courts re-
versed their earlier positions and held that Rule 54(b) did not apply
to the multiple party case. See Bowling Machs., Inc. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 283 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1960); Brandt v. Renfield Importers, Ltd.,
269 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1959); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heinman, 273 F.2d 729
(2d Cir. 1959); Meadows v. Greyhound Corp., 235 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.
1956); Hardy v. Banker's Life & Cas., 222 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1955).
54. The Advisory Committee on Rules said of the 1961 amendment:
A serious difficulty has, however, arisen because the rule
speaks of claims but nowhere mentions parties. A line of
cases has developed in the circuits consistently holding the
rule to be inapplicable to the dismissal, even with the requi-
site trial court determination, of one or more but less than all
defendants jointly charged in an action, i.e., charged with
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Rule 54(b) attempts to strike a balance between the policy
against piecemeal appeals and the need to make immediate review
available in multiple party or multiple claim situations at a time
that best serves the needs of the litigants. 55 The court in Aetna
Insurance Co. v. Newton,58 explained the basic purpose of Rule
54(b):
It [limitation on appellate courts to review only final judgments]
is an authoritative application and implementation of a basic and
persisting policy against piecemeal appeals .... Rule 54(b)
attempts to make a reasonable accommodation between that policy
and those problems of the timing of review which have been ac-
centuated by the liberalized joinder of claims, counterclaims, cross-
claims and third-party claims in one lawsuit, as permitted and
encouraged by the present Rules of Civil Procedure .... [T]he
draftsmen of this Rule [54 (b)] have made explicit their thought
that it would serve only to authorize 'the exercise of a discretionary
power in the infrequent harsh case .... ,57
The federal courts have made it clear that the strong historical pol-
icy against piecemeal appeals has been carried over to Rule 54(b),
and that 54(b) orders should not be entered routinely or as a
courtesy or accommodation to counsel.58
To obtain the certificate prescribed in Rule 54(b), in most cases
a party will simply file a motion requesting the court to make the
determination and direction required by the rule. The district
court, however, may consider the question on its own motion.
Rule 54(b) requires the district court to make two separate de-
cisions before an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties to a lawsuit.
The court must make an "express direction for entry of judgment"
and an "express determination that there is no just reason for de-
various forms of concerted or related wrongdoing or related
liability. (citations omitted). For purposes of Rule 54(b) it
was arguable that there were as many "claims" as there were
parties defendant and that the rule in its present text applied
where less than all of the parties were dismissed (citations
omitted), but the Courts of Appeals are now committed to
an opposite view. The danger of hardship through delay of
appeal until the whole action is concluded may be at least
as serious in the multiple-parties situations as in multiple-
claims cases ... and courts and commentators have urged
that Rule 54(b) be changed to take in the former.
55. 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2654,
at 33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MLLLER].
56. 398 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1968).
57. Id. at 734.
58. Id. See In re Bromley-Health Modernization Comm., 448 F.2d 1271
(1st Cir. 1971); RePass v. Vreeland, 357 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1966);
Thompson v. Trent Maritime Co., 343 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1965).
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lay."59 An express direction for the entry of judgment contem-
plates a finding that the case is one within the scope of Rule 54(b),
i.e. the case must include either multiple claims,60 multiple parties
or both and at least one claim or the rights and liabilities of at
least one party must be finally decided. If there are multiple par-
ties, there need only be one claim in the action. All of the rights
or liabilities of one or more of the parties regarding that claim
must have been fully adjudicated. The district court cannot by
a 54(b) certificate make final and appealable a ruling that is not
final and appealable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1970).(1 The district court's express direction for the entry of
judgment, therefore, is not conclusive as to the "finality" of its
order, and the appellate court may dismiss an appeal even though
the district court executed a 54(b) certificate. 2
The second decision that the district court must make under
Rule 54(b) is an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay. By the exercise of its discretion, 63 in this respect, the
district court has the power to release for appeal final decisions as
to one or more but fewer than all of the multiple claims or mul-
tiple parties. There really is no precise test for determining
whether there is a just reason for delay; the district court must
consider any factors that are relevant. In Campbell v. Westmore-
land Farm, Inc.,64 the court stated, "[T] here must be some danger
of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated
by immediate appeal. ' 65 It is clear therefore that the party de-
59. When a district makes both of the requisite findings, it is referred to
as a "certification" that the particular judgment is ripe for review.
60. Whether a case involves multiple claims is a complex issue beyond
the scope of this article. It is fully disclosed in 10 WRIGHT & IVIILLER,
supra note 55, at § 2657.
61. 6 MOORE, supra note 4, at 54.30(1), at 443; Painton & Co. v. Bourns,
Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 234 (2d Cir. 1971).
62. The question of whether a judgment is final is not discretionary and
the appellate courts have broad reviewing power. 10 WRiGHT & MILLER,
supra note 55, at § 2655, at 38 states:
The failure of some appellate courts to recognize their broad
reviewing power has resulted in some difficulties in analyzing
the cases. The tendency of these courts to view the scope of
their review as allowing the dismissal of an appeal only for an
abuse of discretion when the propriety of the trial court's di-
rection that a final judgment be entered under Rule 54(b) is
called into question is unfortunate.63. The determination respecting injustice through delay is discretionary
with the district court. Contrast this with requirement of express
direction for entry of judgment where the district court really has no
discretion.
64. 403 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1968).
65. Id. at 942. Because the determination respecting delay is discretionary,
the district court by this determination can strike the balance between
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siring an immediate appeal must make some showing in order to
overcome the normal rule that no appeal be heard until the entire
case has been completed.
If an appellate court will be reviewing facts on an appeal pur-
suant to a Rule 54(b) certification that it may be forced to review
again whether another appeal is brought after the district court
renders its decision on the remaining claims or as to the remaining
parties, Rule 54 (b) certification should be withheld. In Panichella
v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 66 Panichella, a railroad employee,
fell on a sidewalk abutting premises of Warner. Panichella sued
the railroad, and the railroad impleaded Warner. Panichella
moved for summary judgment against the railroad and the rail-
road moved for summary judgment against Panichella; both mo-
tions were based on a release Panichella had given to Warner.
The motions were both decided against the railroad, and it desired
an immediate appeal. The appellate court reversed the district
court Rule 54(b) certification because the meaning and effect of
the release might have to be decided a second time when the main
suit was terminated.67
Additional considerations militating against certification are the
policy against hearing appeals that require the appellate court to
determine questions that are before the trial court with regard
to other claims, 3 and the possibility that the need for review might
be mooted by future developments in the district court.09 An im-
mediate appeal may have the effect of delaying the trial. In
Campbell v. Westmoreland Farms, Inc.70 the appellate court re-
the policy against piecemeal appeals and the need in a particular case
for an immediate appeal even though the case still pends as to some
claims or to some parties. Cases cited note 58 supra. See Schaefer v.
First Nat'l Bank, 465 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1972); Panichella v. Pennsyl-
vania R.R., 252 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958).
66. 252 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1958).
67. The Panichella court stated:
[T]he legal effect of the release is in dispute between Pani-
chella and the Railroad and also between the Railroad and
Warner. Since Panichella is not a party to this appeal, no
ruling as to the meaning or effect of the release which we
might make now could or should become res judicata between
the principal parties. The matter would have to be considered
a second time. These considerations point to the desirability
of a single appellate consideration of the effect of the release
when all of the interested parties are before the court, rather
than in the absence of one who is primarily concerned.
Id. at 455.
68. Zangardi v. Tobriner, 330 F.2d 224, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
69. Thompson v. Trent Maritime Co., 343 F.2d 200 (3d Cir. 1965); Buresch
v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
70. 403 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1968).
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versed a district court Rule 54(b) certification where the imme-
diate appeal would delay the trial without any counterveiling ben-
efits. The court further indicated what some of those counterveil-
ing benefits might be:
This is not a case where immediate appeal "would eliminate much
unnecessary evidence, confine the issues, shorten the trial, save
much expense to the litigants in connection with the preparation
for trial and contribute considerably to expediting the work of the
[tIrial court."7"
Presumably if an immediate appeal would produce some of these
benefits, there truly would be no just reason for delay. In those
cases certification should be allowed.72
VII. CONCLUSION
The ultimate conclusion and recommendation of this article is
that Rule 54(b) should be adopted in Nebraska. Rule 54(b) is both
certain and flexible. These virtues do not exist together in any
one of the three alternative rules discussed above.
Perhaps the greatest argument in favor of Rule 54(b) is that
from the parties' standpoint, the rule brings to the area much cer-
tainty. Under Rule 54(b), the parties to an action know when an
order is or is not appealable. An appeal is not necessary, nor is one
allowed, from an order adjudicating the rights and liabilities of
one or more but fewer than all the parties to an action where the
district court has not entered the certificate. Absent a certificate,
the single judicial unit rule applies, and the order may not be ap-
pealed until all the issues as to all the parties are determined. In
addition, Rule 54(b) significantly adds to the certainty of the cor-
rect procedure to follow because it is the trial judge who makes
the decision as to finality and appealability. The parties no longer
carry the burden of predicting whether some appellate court will
later say that the liability of the parties is either identical or sev-
erable. The trial judge is the best person to make the determina-
tion. He is close to the case; he is familiar with the parties and
issues involved. The trial judge can take into consideration any
exigencies peculiar to a particular case which may militate either
toward delaying an appeal or toward allowing an immediate ap-
peal. The decision whether to issue the certificate is within the
discretion of the trial court; however, the lower court's order may
be reversed by a court of appeals for an abuse of discretion. Only
in rare cases will the trial court's decision be reversed.
71. Id. at 942.
72. See Hobart v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 255 F. Supp. 972 (D. Miss. 1965);
Klebanoff v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 246 F. Supp. 935 (D. Conn. 1965).
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Both the single judicial unit rule and the Nebraska rule are cer-
tain. But, they provide certainty only by being arbitrary. Under
Rule 54(b), the parties are sure of the correct procedure; and
equally important the correct procedure in any given case is de-
termined on the basis of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
that particular case.
Flexibility is built into Rule 54(b) by allowing the trial court
such broad discretion in determining whether to certify an order
and allow an immediate appeal. The trial court will be faced with
the same problem of balancing the policy against piecemeal ap-
peals and the policy of avoiding unjust delay that the joint liability
test attempts to accomplish. The joint liability test cannot suc-
cessfully accomplish this accommodation of competing interests be-
cause its inquiry is limited in scope to the finding of the absence
or presence of jointness. Rule 54(b) is unlimited in the scope of
its inquiry. Any and all factors that may have a bearing on the
question of appealability may be considered by the trial court.
Robert J. Banta '74
